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This study aims to empirically verify the effects of natural resource rents on inclusive human 
development in developing countries. The results from the IV Tobit regression show that natural 
resource rents have a positive direct effect on inclusive human development in developing countries 
and that this relationship varies by regional groupings, income levels, level of development and 
export structure. Looking at the transmission mechanisms, when the interactive variables of 
governance and environmental quality is introduced, the modulating channel through governance 
exerts a robust negative synergy effect in the sample of developing countries and positive synergy 
effects for Africa and low-income countries. When the interactive variable of CO2 emissions is 
introduced for Africa, a negative net effect of natural resource rents on inclusive human development 
is obtained. This was up to a policy threshold of 25.4412 of CO2 emissions when the   negative effect 
is nullified. For Asia and the Latin America and Caribbean, a positive net effect is obtained. This is 
up to a CO2 emissions threshold of 29.038 and 3.6752 respectively, when the positive effect is 
nullified. Besides, the high income and the upper-middle income countries produce a negative net 
effect of resource rents on inclusive human development through CO2 modulation, with up to 
positive CO2 emission thresholds of 37.9365 and 23.6257 respectively. Policy implications are 
highlighted. In summary, contingent on engaged specificities, where conditional effects are negative, 
negative thresholds for complementary policies have been provided and in scenarios where 
conditional impacts are positive, actionable positive thresholds have been provided. 
Key Words: Resource Rents, Inclusive Human Development, Institutional Quality, Environmental 
Quality. 
JEL Code: P48; O11; C23 
1. Introduction 
The question whether natural resource wealth is a blessing or curse to development outcomes 
remains a contemporary debate among researchers and policy makers. This study empirically verifies 
whether natural resource rents contribute to the enhancement of human development which is 
necessary for sustainable economic growth. Since the pioneering works of Auty (1993) concluding 
that countries rich in natural resources recorded low development outcomes than their resource-poor 
counterparts, several studies have emerged, evaluating this hypothesis by exploring various 
explanatory variables encompassing economic, institutional, political and environmental factors 
(Auty, 1995; Di John, 2011; Carmignani and Avom, 2010; Carmignani, 2013). 
While several growth studies reveal that the impact of natural resources on a country’s 
development outcomes depends on human capital (Gylfason, 2001; Zalle, 2019), others reiterate the 
importance of institutional quality (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2013). Several studies argue that 
natural resource wealth negatively impacts on institutional quality as it prevents the development of 
institutional reforms thereby retarding economic development (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Isham et 
al., 2005; Norman, 2009). For example, poor institutional quality (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Sala-i-
Martin and Subramanian, 2013), lower levels of the rule of law (Norman, 2009) economic 
mismanagement (Badeeb et al., 2017) and high levels of corruption (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; 
Bulte and Damania, 2008; Zalle, 2019) are predominant in natural resource-rich countries. 
However, there is yet no consensus among researchers on the effect of natural resource wealth 
on development outcomes and the transmission mechanisms. Recently, Havranek et al. (2016) 
revealed that while approximately 20% and 40% of empirical studies have respectively found a 
positive and negative effect, about 40% of studies do not find any effect. Nevertheless, this 
variability in results across studies may arise from the use of different variables in controlling for 
institutional quality, the distinction between resource dependence and abundance as well as 
distinction between various types of natural resources (Havranek et al., 2016). The effect of natural 
resources on development outcomes has equally been examined through its effects on human capital 
(Khan et al., 2020; Ahmed et al., 2020).   
A majority of human capital related studies have been concerned with the contribution of 
human capital (notably education and health) to growth. Hence, the question whether investments in 
human capital can spur sustainable development has been the concern of several contemporary 
economists. The role of human capital in explaining growth can be traced to the initial neoclassical 
growth theory developed in 1956 by the 1987 Economics Noble Prize Winner, Robert Solow. 
Although Solow Growth theory (Solow, 1956) does not lay emphasis on various components of 
human capital, it makes use of physical and human capital as important inputs to production. 
Nevertheless, the importance of human capital development in the growth process of every economy 
has been emphasized by protagonists of endogenous growth theory (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990; 
Pack, 1994). 
Private or public spending on education, training and healthcare constitute investments in 
human capital since human beings are inseparable from their knowledge, skills and health (Becker, 
1992). Ample literature has demonstrated the role of education (Mankiw et al., 1992; Maksymenko 
and Rabani, 2011; Qadri and Waheed, 2014) and health (Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Bhargava et al, 
2001; Bloom et al., 2004; Jayadevan, 2021) on economic growth and development across various 
countries. 
In this light, investments in the health and educational sectors have far reaching positive 
benefits on the growth of every economy. Quality health and education are fundamental for the 
enhancement of human capital. Access to educational facilities enables the acquisition of knowledge 
and skills. Improved human capital not only increases the individual’s skills, but also enhances his 
productivity, earnings and quality of life (Berker, 1992; Webber, 2002; Eggoh et al., 2015; Ogundari 
and Awokuse, 2018). However, poor quality of institutions characterised by corruption and 
bureaucracy can blur the contribution of human capital to economic growth. This believe is affirmed 
in a study of 49 African countries by Eggoh et al. (2015) arguing that human capital through health 
and education expenditures negatively impacted Africa’s economic growth over the 1996-2010 
period. 
Nowadays, there has been a paradigmatic shift in the perception of the development agenda of 
countries around the world. Sustainable development encompasses many indicators and various 
functional sectors as outlined in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted 
in 2015. Hence, besides considering the economic dimension (notably economic growth indicators), 
any country dreaming to attain sustainable development must consider the social dimension with 
regard to enhancements in human capital through quality health and education (Raheem et al., 2018; 
Ogundari and Awokuse, 2018; Jayadevan, 2021) as well as ensuring environmental sustainability 
(Asongu et al., 2016; Sarkodie et al., 2020; Hassan et al., 2020; Erdogan et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 
2021). Nevertheless, to achieve this, there is need to consider the quality of institutions given that 
governance indicators like corruption and the rule of law (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2013; 
Bulte and Damania, 2008; Zalle, 2019) are believed to greatly affect the functioning of the economy. 
It is in this light that this paper is out to examine the underlying effects of natural resource rents on 
inclusive human capital development. 
Specifically, the contribution of this paper to the existing literature is at least threefold: first, 
studies on this subject have often focused on small sub-regional groupings such as Asia Pacific 
countries (Sinha and Sengupta, 2019). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
empirically establish the effects of natural resources rents on inclusive human development on a 
global sample of developing countries. Second, the transmission mechanisms through which natural 
resources rents affect inclusive human development have often been limited to globalisation in the 
literature (Sinha and Sengupta, 2019), whereas, developing countries are characterised by relatively 
poor quality of institutions. Besides, the exploitation of natural resources is often characterised by the 
disposal of harmful waste and gas into the environment. This study thus considers the modulating 
effects of institutional quality and environmental quality in how resource rents affect inclusive human 
development. Third, developing countries are not uniform with respect to their levels of 
development. Some are rich in natural resources than others, while each country or region is peculiar 
with its own type of natural resources. Besides some have comparative advantages based on their 
geographical locations while others in terms of their export structure. This study therefore undertakes 
a comparative analysis based on geographical groupings, income levels, levels of development and 
export structure. 
After this brief introduction, the rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two presents a 
review of salient literature. The methodology is contained in section three. The results are presented 
and discussed in section 4. Section 5 provides a conclusion and policy implications. 
2. Review of Selected Literature 
The premise that endowments in natural resources can catalyse economic growth in countries 
rich in natural resources has not been of universal acceptance among scholars. Unlike Balassa (1980), 
a number of growth studies have provided paradoxical results by demonstrating that resource-poor 
countries can outperform their resource-rich counterparts. Economic literature refers to this 
phenomenon as the resource curse (Auty, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 1995). Over the past decade, 
several studies have confirmed the validity of the resource curse hypothesis across various regions 
and countries (Carmignani and Avom, 2010; Shao and Yang, 2014; Badeeb et al., 2017). Moreover, 
several channels through which natural resource wealth can impact socioeconomic development have 
been identified. While some studies look at the interaction between real GDP growth and natural 
resource abundance and dependence, others explore the link between natural resource rents and 
institutional quality. Moreover, the need to ensure an inclusive human capital development which 
takes various forms of inequalities into consideration in the construction of the human development 
index, increasing research interest has been on the nexus between natural resource rents and inclusive 
human capital development, as well as between natural resource rents, information and 
communication technology (ICT) and environmental sustainability. In this section, we explore some 
salient literature with respect to the aforementioned indicators both at the individual and cross-
country levels. 
Zalle (2019) employing the ARDL modelling approach argues that natural resources enhance 
human capital development in Africa. In addition, his findings support the validity of the resource 
curse thesis. Moreover, improvements in human capital positively affect economic growth. However, 
the author concludes that natural resources can spur economic growth by simultaneously controlling 
for the indirect effects of corruption and human capital. This result is in congruence to earlier 
findings by Bulte and Damania (2008). 
Canh et al. (2020) employ the two-step system GMM approach to examine the institutional 
quality and entrepreneurial effects on natural resource rents over the 2006-2016 period and conclude 
that while improvements in institutional quality lead to reductions in total natural resource rents, 
increased entrepreneurial activities have a soaring effect on natural resource rents for sample of 60 
countries across the globe. However, in an earlier study, Bulte and Damania (2008) contend that high 
levels of corruption and poor democratic practices are responsible for the resource curse experienced 
by most resource-rich countries. Poor institutional quality has equally been blamed for the poor 
economic performance of the Nigerian economy despite her rich natural resource base (Sala-i-Martin 
and Subramanian, 2013). 
Another body of literature probes into the nexus between natural resource wealth, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and financial development (Yildirim et al., 2020; Guan et al., 2020; Asif et al., 
2020). Intuitively, financial development and increased FDI has the ability of boosting domestic 
investment across various socioeconomic sectors. The increased investment resulting from increased 
FDI and financial development will lead to a fall in the level of unemployment which in turn 
increases the income level both at the individual and national levels. Increased individual income will 
enable the individual to increase investments in education and health. In this light, FDI and financial 
development can be perceived as indirect mechanisms for modulating the effects of natural resources 
on human capital development. The few studies in this perspective have not provided concordant 
results. While some authors opine that natural resources lead to financial development especially in 
high income countries (Shahbaz et al., 2018; Gokmenoglu and Rustamov, 2019), others report a 
negative relation especially for developing countries (Guan et al., 2020; Asif et al., 2020). 
With the help of the ARDL and VECM models, Hassan et al. (2020) examine the linkages 
between total natural resources, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and real income per capita in 
Pakistan for the 1971-2017 period, and reveal that natural resources use leads to environmental 
degradation through increased CO2 emissions. They also find evidence of bidirectional causality 
between natural resources use and CO2 emissions. Erdogan et al. (2020) in their empirical 
investigation of the effects of natural resources, globalization, human capital, and urbanization on the 
ecological footprint for a sample of 23 resource-based Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries employ 
the fully modified ordinary least squares approach and found that both natural resource dependence 
and abundance dampen environmental quality. However, unlike natural resources which negatively 
affect environmental quality, the authors posit that improvements in human capital and globalisation 
positively impact on the environmental quality of SSA countries. In a related study for 18 SSA 
countries, Raheem et al. (2018) concludes that natural resource rents and investments in human 
capital especially through health expenditure have a stimulating effect on economic growth. 
Increased growth therefore has a tendency of worsening environmental quality following the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis. Contrarily, Behbudi et al. (2010) posit that human 
capital and resource abundance are the major roadblocks for economic development of resource-rich 
countries. 
Recent development studies have been concerned with the examination of the key determinants 
of inclusive human development. For example, a number of studies have stressed the importance of 
information and communication technologies (ICT) and environmental degradation (Asongu and Le 
Roux, 2017; Asongu et al., 2019; Khan et al., 2019; Asongu and Odhiambo, 2019), globalisation and 
natural resource rents as well as economic, political and institutional governance (Asongu and 
Nwachukwu, 2016; Sinha and Sengupta, 2019; Nathaniel et al., 2021; Pata et al., 2021) in enhancing 
inclusive human development. While Asongu and Le Roux (2017) contend that ICT (through 
telephone, mobile phone, and internet penetrations) encourages inclusive human development in a 
panel of 49 SSA countries, Asongu and Odhiambo (2019) opine that the positive contribution of ICT 
(through mobile phone penetration) to inclusive human development is slowed down by the low 
quality of formal education, especially at the primary level. Similar results have been found by Khan 
et al. (2019) in a related study for Pakistan. 
Moreover, Asungo et al. (2019) found that improvements in ICT dampen the negative impacts 
of CO2 emissions on inclusive human development in SSA. The modulating effects are however 
divergent across various sub-regional groupings. On the natural resource and human development 
nexus, Sinha and Sengupta (2019) established a positive effect of resource rents on human 
development modulated through globalisation, good governance and strong institutions. However, 
Khan et al. (2019) contend that trade openness, FDI and urbanisation have adverse effects on 
inclusive development of Pakistan. Besides, Asongu et al. (2017) adopt the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) to assess the complementarity effects between ICT and environmental degradation 
on inclusive development of 44 SSA countries and argue that the ability of ICT tools (such as the 
electronic settlement of hospital bills through internet and mobile phones) to avert unwarranted 
transport cost and enhance the efficient management of households and businesses can enable the 
abatement of CO2 emissions. Thus, the author concludes that the complementarity between ICT use 
(mobile phone penetration) and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions have a net positive effect on 
inclusive human development. 
 
3. Econometric Strategy 
3.1 Empirical model specification  
Based on existing literature, the following empirical model can be specified: 𝐼𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖𝑡                               (1) 
Where IHDI is the human development index corrected for inequality, Resources is the natural 
resources rents. X is a vector of control variables. µ is the stochastic error term, subscripts i and t are 
the individual and the time dimensions of the panel. 
The dependent variable, IHDI is used as a proxy for inclusive human development in 
accordance with existing literature (Asongu et al., 2017; Asongu and Le Roux, 2017). The indicator 
is the HDI adjusted for inequality. The HDI is made up of 3 basic dimensions, namely: health and life 
expectancy, education, and basic living standards. Lastly the adjustment for inequality in the 
distribution of the last 3 dimensions yields the IHDI. In the computational process of the IHDI, the 
inequality term is introduced during the normalisation process of the variables that constitute each of 
the dimensions of the HDI. 
The variable of interest, Resources is the measure of resources rents. The variable is chosen 
based on existing literature (Sinha and Sengupta, 2019). Natural resources rents is measured through 
the total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP (Resources_Rent), forest rent as a percentage 
of GDP (Forest_Rent), Mineral rents as a percentage of GDP (Mineral_rents), Oil rents as a 
percentage of GDP (Oil_rents). Sinha and Sengupta (2019) established a positive effect of resources 
rents on human development modulated through globalisation. In line with this view, the first 
hypothesis of the study is stated thus: Natural resources affect inclusive human development in 
developing countries. 
Five control variables are retained to control for omitted variables bias in our model. These are 
foreign direct investment inflows (FDI), trade openness index (trade), information and 
communication technology (ICT) proxied by internet penetration rate (Internet), environmental 
protection proxied by the carbon dioxide emission rate (CO2), and governance measured as the 
average of the six governance indicators of Kaufmann. This arithmetic aggregation of the indicators 
is based on contemporary literature (Ngouhouo et al., 2021). These indicators are: Control of 
corruption (Corruption), Regulatory Quality (Reg_qual), Political stability and absence of violence 
(Political_Stability), Rule of law (Rule_law), Voice and accountability (Voice_Account), 
Government Effectiveness (Governmt_Eff). Asongu et al. (2017) argued that CO2, ICT and FDI all 
positively enhance inclusive human development in Africa. A positive sign is thus expected to be 
associated to these variables. Asongu and Odhiambo (2019) argued that good governance enhances 
inclusive human development. A positive sign is thus expected to be associated to this variable. 
Under normal circumstances, the availability of natural resources and their exploitation within 
the economy entails disposal of waste unto the environment. Moreover, the machines used in the 
exploitation release a lot of gas into the air which may have great consequences on human health and 
as a result on human development. Furthermore, for natural resources rents to impact human 
development, the revenue from the exploitation of natural resources must be used in the economic 
and social development of the country such as providing for health services, ensuring quality 
education just to name a few. This can only be realised if an efficient institution is put in place that 
ensures this. From the above arguments, the second hypothesis of this study is that governance and 
environmental quality are the main mechanisms through which natural resources rents impact 
human development. 
Accounting for this transmission channels in an econometric model entails introducing a 
multiplicative interactive term of CO2 and Governance in (1). 𝐼𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡+ 𝜋1(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 x 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝜋2(𝐶𝑂2𝑖𝑡x 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) + µ𝑖𝑡                 (2) 
Where 𝛽 is the coefficient of the variables that captures the direct explaining factors of 
inclusive human development, π is the coefficient of the variables that captures the indirect effect of 
inclusive human development determinants. Differentiating (2) in first place with respect to 
Resources yields: 𝜕𝐼𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡𝜕𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝜋1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋2𝐶𝑂2𝑖𝑡                                                    (3) 
Where 𝟃 is the partial derivative operator.  Unit change in resources rents depends on the sign 
and magnitude of the interactive variables “Governance” and “CO2”. Based on the signs and 
significance of 𝛽1 and π, this interactive effect could yield a net effect such that: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = {𝛽1 + (Ω × 𝜋)     𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝛽1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜋 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑛. 𝑎                                             𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝛽1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜋 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡      (4) 
Where n.a here implies “not applicable” and as a result, the net effect cannot be computed. Π is 
the magnitude of the indirect effect, Ω is the average of the policy modulating variable(s) under 
consideration. 
3.2 Data 
The data for the human development index is collected from the UNDP database. Data on 
governance is collected from the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank while the rest 
of the variables are collected from the World Development indicators of the World Bank. The data 
covers the 1996-2019 periods for 107 Developing countries. The list of countries and sources of data 
are detailed in Appendices 1 and 2 respectively. Table 1 highlights the summary statistics of the 
variables used. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Inclusive human development 2,482  0.606401 0.150407 0.244 0.949 
Environmental quality 2,268 3.670566 7.429898 0.01628 70.04223 
Foreign direct investments 2,554 4.310621 7.491572 -37.1548 161.8237 
Trade openness 2,367 83.96471 54.69998 0.026889 442.62 
Internet penetration rate 2,393 17.71138 23.01605 0 99.70151 
Total resources rents (%GDP) 2,448 10.46584 12.61293 0.000188 84.22876 
Governance index 2,582 -0.65057 4.088979 -2.09 2.41265 
Forest rents (%GDP) 2,452 3.209093 5.140509 0 40.42677 
Mineral rents (%GDP) 2,452 1.663264 4.334086 0 46.62465 
Gas rents(%GDP) 2,411 0.458844 1.24267 0 13.69206 
Oil rents(%GDP) 2,448 4.992922 11.4693 0 78.54109 
Control of Corruption 2,588 -0.32836 0.771676 -1.82638 2.32558 
Government effectiveness 2,585 -0.34393 0.776379 -2.27942 2.436975 
Regulatory quality 2,586 -0.32877 0.768096 -2.42551 2.260543 
Rule of law 2,589 -0.37805 0.754002 -2.32212 1.878559 
Voice and account 2,589 -0.36416 0.779024 -2.23327 1.342969 
Political stability 2,585 -0.28424 0.893638 -2.1808 1.615338 
Source: authors 
At the same time, Figure 1 presents the sense of correlation between natural resources rents and 
inclusive human development for our sample. 
 
Figure 1. Correlation of Total resources rents and inclusive human development. 
 
Source: Authors 
Figure 1 shows that most countries in our sample have very low human development scores, at 
the same time, resources rents on average represent a significant portion of the GDP of countries 
under study. Just slightly below 20% of GDP. While that of inclusive development is crowded 
around the 0.6 value. At the same time, the resources rents and inclusive development nexus seems to 
be negative though not very strong; control variables are thus very likely to influence this perceived 
weak relationship. However, before proceeding to our methodology, there is need to see the 



















Figure 2 shows that oil rent has greatly contributed to resources rents than other natural 
resources and is highly dispersed. In fact, the high dispersion of total natural resource rents is as a 
result of a similar trend in oil rent. This is seen from their standard deviation values in table 1. 
3.3. Estimation Method 
This study adopts the Tobit regression based on contemporary literature (Asongu and Le Roux, 
2017). This method is appropriate in the sense that the inequality adjusted human development index 
has a limited range (between 0 and 1). In this case, estimation by Ordinary Least Squares will 
produce biased results. A doubled censored Tobit regression is thus adopted to account for the 
limited range in the dependent variable (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Koetter et al., 2008; Ariss, 
2010; Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2010; Asongu and Le Roux, 2017). Our data values however do not 
contain 0 and 1 in the observations. In fact it ranges between 0.244 and 0.949. Estimation with a 
doubled censored Tobit in this case is similar to estimation with a linear regression because the 
likelihood functions coincide. At the same time, given that there is possibility of double causality 
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Tobit is adopted in place of a simple Tobit regression.  We start through a simple Tobit model as 
follows: 𝐼𝐻𝐷𝐼∗𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖𝑡                              (2) 
Where 𝐼𝐻𝐷𝐼∗ is the hidden response variable, X is the observed vector of explanatory 
variables, 𝛼0 is a constant, and µ is an independent variable in X which is identically and 
independently distributed. The observation of the latent response variable is based on the value of a 
stochastic constant γ, such that: 
𝐼𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = {𝐼𝐻𝐷𝐼∗𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐻𝐷𝐼∗𝑖𝑡 > 𝛾0 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐻𝐷𝐼∗𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾                               (3) 
The value of the latent variable is thus missing when it is less than or equal to 𝛾. The above 
modelling procedure however applies to simple Tobit models. To control for the simultaneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity dimensions of endogeneity in our case, the instrumental variable (IV) Tobit 
is used and the Natural resources rents: 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛿(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜈𝑖 + µ𝑖𝑡            (4) 
Where the variables are defined as in equation (1), at period t and (t-1). 𝜈𝑖 is the country fixed 
effect. In the same line, the instrumental procedure for Governance is as follows: 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛿(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜈𝑖 + µ𝑖𝑡                   (5) 
 This procedure in (4) and (5) is equally applied to CO2. The instrumented procedure is as in 
contemporary literature (Asongu and Le Roux, 2017). That is regressing the variable by its 
corresponding lag and saving the fitted values. The fitted values are then used as the main 
explanatory variable in the Tobit regression. For the regression to be valid, the Wald test of 
exogeneity must be significant. It is a Chi2 test under the null hypothesis of exogeneity. The rejection 





4. Results and Discussion 
The results present in the first place the direct effect of natural resource rents on inclusive 
human development and then, the interactive regression of natural resources with governance. In 
each of these regressions, robustness is checked using alternative measures of resources rents and 
sensitivity verified across regions, income group, export structures and level of development.  
4.1 Direct effect 
The results in Table 2 indicate that natural resource rents is significantly enhancing on inclusive 
human development. However, this result varies based on the indicator of natural resources used. 
While total natural resources rents, gas rents and oil rents are enhancing, forest rents and mineral 
rents are harmful to inclusive human development. Looking at other control variables, governance, 
carbon dioxide emissions and information and communication technology enhance IHDI while 
foreign direct investment is harmful. Trade openness though enhancing is non-significant. This result 
corroborates that of Sinha and Sengupta (2019) in Asian Pacific countries. Revenues from natural 
resources especially in natural resources dependent economies (which is the case in most developing 
economies) are used in providing basic social amenities for citizens. These include providing 
education, health facilities and creating jobs that reduces social inequalities. These are essential 
elements for inclusive human development. However, in most of these countries, the quality of 
governance has led to the misappropriation of these rents. This has led to very low human 
development scores in most of these countries despite abundance in natural resources. 
The negative effect of forest and gas rents on inclusive human development can be justified by 
the fact that, rents of forest resources implies forests are gradually exploited leading to deforestation. 
This has adverse consequences on the environment, negatively impacting on the health status of 
individuals and a result on human development. It is thus interesting for us to test this transmission 
mechanism through environmental quality and quality of institutions. Before assessing the 
transmission mechanisms, it is worth evaluating if result obtained is sensitive across regions, income 
groups, export structure and level of development. The regions here mention are the geographical 
regions of each country. This is specifically considered because natural resources are extracted 
beneath or on the earth surface, specific locations are maybe favourable in natural resources 
abundance than others. For instance, desert areas are less favourable with forest rents. Furthermore, 
income groups are considered due to the fact that high income countries have the tendency of 
investing in areas that improve human development than low income countries, there is thus need to 
see the behaviour of results across these groups. Moreover, Oil rents in predominant in the total 
natural resources rents indicator, whereas, not all developing countries are oil exporters. There is thus 
need to see if there is a comparative advantage in oil exports in developing human development than 
other natural resources. 
 
Table 2.Tobit Non-interactive regression: Dependent variable=Inequality adjusted human development index. 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Governance 
    
0.0179*** 0.0111*** 0.0157*** 0.0170*** 0.0192*** 
      
(-0.00241) (-0.00166) (-0.00161) (-0.00172) (-0.00182) 
CO2 
     
0.00374*** 0.00397*** 0.00445*** 0.00380*** 0.00189*** 
      
(-0.00059) (-0.0003) (-0.00034) (-0.00043) (-0.00049) 
FDI 
     
-0.00076** 0.000392 -0.000613* -0.000742** -0.00031 
      
(-0.00036) (-0.00032) (-0.00035) (-0.00035) (-0.00034) 
Trade 
     
0.0000167 0.00007.5 0.0000532 0.0000467 -0.0000327 
      
(-6.56E-05) (-5.07E-05) (-5.62E-05) (-5.69E-05) (-5.92E-05) 
Internet 
     
0.00285*** 0.00258*** 0.00289*** 0.00279*** 0.00286*** 
      
(-0.00016) (-0.00013) (-0.00015) (-0.00016) (-0.00015) 
resourcesrents 0.0591** 
    
0.000681* 
   
 
(-0.028) 
    
(-0.00038) 
    Forest rents -0.169** 





    
(-0.00057) 
   Mineral rents 
 
0.0438*** 
   
-0.00074 
  
   
(-0.007) 
    
(-0.00053) 
  Gas rents 
   
0.242*** 
    
0.00722*** 
    
(-0.044) 
    
(-0.00246) 
 Oil rents 
    
-0.196 
    
0.00266*** 
     
(-0.277) 
    
(-0.0003) 
Constant -0.0147 1.129*** 0.529*** 0.490*** 1.588 0.573*** 0.590*** 0.570*** 0.573*** 0.578*** 
 
(-0.294) (-0.248) (-0.013) (-0.022) (-1.392) (-0.0097) (-0.00744) (-0.00892) (-0.00921) (-0.00926) 
Observations 2,341 2,345 2,345 2,304 2,341 1,961 1,961 1,961 1,956 1,961 
chi2_exog 122.9*** 149.3*** 138.8*** 106.9*** 128.6*** 4.64** 2.863* 3.36* 5.287** 5.303** 
chi2 4.443** 4.474** 40.75*** 30.38*** 0.499** 3038*** 4648*** 3033*** 3013*** 3169*** 
Source: Authors.    NB: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1: CO2 is environmental quality,  FDI is foreign direct 
investment
 
Table 3. Sensitivity of the non-interactive regression across regions and export structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






VARIABLES Dependent variables: inequality adjusted human development index 
Governance -0.0207** 0.0171*** 0.00667*** 0.0131*** 0.00104 
 (0.00929) (0.00422) (0.00141) (0.00461) (0.00331) 
Environmental quality 0.0393*** 0.00208*** 0.0181*** 0.00258*** 0.0253*** 
 (0.00466) (0.000676) (0.00203) (0.000889) (0.00257) 
Foreign direct investment 0.000160 0.00165*** 0.000791 -0.00279*** 0.00107*** 
 (0.000537) (0.000489) (0.000877) (0.000759) (0.000366) 
Trade 0.000691*** -0.000250* -0.000126* -0.000354 8.62e-05 
 (0.000174) (0.000147) (6.87e-05) (0.000222) (5.80e-05) 
Internet 0.00453*** 0.00191*** 0.00167*** 0.00202*** 0.00296*** 
 (0.000381) (0.000135) (0.000120) (0.000238) (0.000160) 
Resources rents -0.00392** 0.000545 0.000910* 0.00181*** -0.00442*** 
 (0.00160) (0.000357) (0.000518) (0.000484) (0.000518) 
Constant 0.339*** 0.653*** 0.622*** 0.631*** 0.513*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0209) (0.00885) (0.0288) (0.0124) 
Observations 909 585 467 444 1,517 
chi2_exog 22.55*** 0.367* 3.489* 0.387* 8.724** 
chi2 813.1*** 1704*** 1090*** 597.0*** 3837*** 
Rank 7 7 7 7 7 
Tobitll 0.244 0.401 0.428 0.263 0.244 
Tobitul 0.800 0.936 0.845 0.864 0.936 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors 
 
The results indicate that natural resources rents is harmful on inclusive human 
development in Africa, Non-oil exporting countries, high income countries, lower-middle 
income countries, lower income countries, least developed countries and less developed 
countries. The positive effect is in upper-middle income countries, Asia, Latin America and 
Caribbean and in oil exporting countries. 
 
  
Table 4.Sensitivity of the non-interactive regression across income levels and development levels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 










VARIABLES Dependent variables: inequality adjusted human development index 
Governance -0.000794 0.0330* -0.0140** -0.135 -0.0538*** 0.0144*** 
 (0.00248) (0.0189) (0.00657) (0.0839) (0.0131) (0.00175) 
CO2 0.00111*** -0.000368 0.0355*** 0.367** 0.162*** 0.00256*** 
 (0.000175) (0.00318) (0.00462) (0.175) (0.0350) (0.000437) 
FDI 0.00101*** 0.00188 0.00249*** 0.00331 0.000654 -0.000126 
 (0.000362) (0.00134) (0.000857) (0.00235) (0.00116) (0.000307) 
Trade 0.000107*** -0.00103* 0.000226 0.000904 0.000944*** -0.000110** 
 (3.39e-05) (0.000532) (0.000150) (0.000706) (0.000278) (4.91e-05) 
Internet 0.000930*** 0.00239*** 0.00339*** 0.0118*** 0.00848*** 0.00213*** 
 (6.77e-05) (0.000287) (0.000302) (0.00450) (0.00140) (0.000111) 
Resources rents -0.000732*** 0.00577* -0.00291*** -0.0166* -0.00689*** 0.000745** 
 (0.000229) (0.00336) (0.000900) (0.00934) (0.00144) (0.000302) 
Constant 0.749*** 0.716*** 0.434*** -0.178 0.156*** 0.633*** 
 (0.00997) (0.0416) (0.0327) (0.340) (0.0605) (0.00657) 
Observations 302 603 597 443 610 1,351 
chi2_exog 2.046* 10.42** 15.76*** 121.3*** 113.8*** 1.600* 
chi2 458.9*** 126.7*** 387.6*** 13.00** 110.6*** 2127*** 
Rank 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Tobitll 0.693 0.518 0.379 0.244 0.244 0.289 
Tobitul 0.936 0.840 0.735 0.547 0.637 0.936 
NB: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1: CO2 is the environmental 
quality, and FDI is foreign direct investments 
 Source: Authors 
 
 
4.2. Accounting for Transmission Channels 
From the direct effect established, there is need to verify if governance and environmental 
quality are effective mechanisms through which the effect of resources rents is modulated on 
inclusive human development. In this light, there is a direct effect and the interactive effect. 
These can yield net or synergy effects depending on the signs of the direct and interactive 
effects. In accordance with reliable existing literature on interactive regressions (Tchamyou et 
al., 2019; Asongu and Nchofoung, 2021), the net effects of resource rents on inclusive human 
development are computed on the bases of average values of the policy variables. That is CO2, 
governance and the constituent indicators of the governance variable, notably, control of 
corruption, voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law and 
regulatory quality. In the computational process, when at least one of the variables needed to 
compute the net or threshold effect is insignificant, the computation is non-applicable (n.a) or 
when the sign of the direct and interactive effect is the same which we talked of synergy effect 
(s.e).  
Table 5 indicates that the effect of natural resources on inclusive development has a 
negative synergy effect through governance. This synergy effect is robust to alternative measures 
of governance. Looking at these transmission mechanisms by regions as in Table 6, governance 
has a synergy positive effect in modulating resources rents on inclusive development in Africa 
and low income countries. The effect in other regions or income groups cannot be applicable due 
to the non-significance of at least one of either the conditional or unconditional coefficients. 
Furthermore, Table 7 indicates that environmental quality negatively interacts with natural 
resources rents to produce a negative marginal effect in developing countries. But the influence 
of the direct effect overcomes this negative marginal effect producing a positive net effect. This 
is up to a CO2 threshold of 111.42. This is not however a feasible threshold for developing 
countries because it is out of the range of values of total natural resources rents presented in the 
summary statistics. In Africa, the negative unconditional effect of natural resources overrides the 
positive marginal effect through CO2 emission producing a negative net effect of natural 
resources rents on inclusive human development. This is up to a policy threshold of 25.4412 of 
CO2 emission when the   negative effect becomes positive. This has policy implications as the 
computed value is within the range of values of CO2 presented in the summary Statistics.
Table 5. Dynamism of governance on the Natural resources and inclusive development relationship 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Dependent variables: inequality adjusted human development index 
Control variables Yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Governance 0.0199***       
 (0.00263)       
Resources rents -0.00145*** -0.00174*** -0.00105*** -0.00157*** -0.00143*** -0.00396*** -0.00239*** 
 (0.000270) (0.000279) (0.000272) (0.000245) (0.000263) (0.000414) (0.000515) 
Governance×resources rents -0.000462***       
 (7.85e-05)       
Corruption (A)  0.117***      
  (0.0164)      
A×resources  -0.00303***      
  (0.000476)      
Government effectiveness(B)   0.0817***     
   (0.0108)     
B×resources rents   -0.00141***     
   (0.000331)     
Regulatory quality(C)    0.0840***    
    (0.0111)    
C×resources rents    -0.00213***    
    (0.000366)    
Rule of law ( D )     0.120***   
     (0.0169)   
D×resources rents     -0.00271***   
     (0.000481)   
Voice and accountability (E)      0.150***  
      (0.0216)  
E×resources rents      -0.00562***  
      (0.000792)  
Political Stability (F)       0.321*** 
       (0.0936) 
F×resources rents       -0.00960*** 
       (0.00294) 
Constant 0.580*** 0.592*** 0.565*** 0.559*** 0.592*** 0.561*** 0.699*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0126) (0.00862) (0.00793) (0.0125) (0.00882) (0.0562) 
Observations 1,961 1,963 1,963 1,963 1,963 1,963 1,961 
chi2_exog 2.266* 12.65** 1.648* 0.00263** 9.106** 15.23*** 43.69*** 
chi2 3189*** 2728*** 3315*** 3189*** 2870*** 2662*** 639.6999 
Tobitll 0.244 0.244 0.244 0.244 0.244 0.244 0.244 
Tobitul 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.936 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: authors 
 
Table 6. Dynamism of governance across Geographical regions and income levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Africa Asia Latin America and 
Caribbean 
High income Upper middle Lower Middle Low Income 
VARIABLES Dependent Variable: Inequality adjusted human development index 
Control variables yes Yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
Governance (A) -0.0186** 0.0225*** 0.00739*** -0.000909 0.00180** -0.0160** -0.111*** 
 (0.0074959) (0.0055051) (0.0019716 ) (0.0029062) (0.0008324) (0.0073668) (0.0374408) 
Resources rents 0.00364*** -0.000290 0.000818* -0.000743*** 0.000271 0.000670 0.0397*** 
 (0.000975) (0.000225) (0.000485) (0.000264) (0.000360) (0.00100) (0.0140) 
A×resources rent 0.00105*** -0.000391*** -0.000147 2.13e-05 -4.50e-07 0.000669** 0.00719*** 
 (0.000309) (0.000114) (0.000140) (8.86e-05) (4.89e-05) (0.000313) (0.00242) 
Constant 0.326*** 0.674*** 0.624*** 0.750*** 0.0471*** (0.0312) (0.184) 
 (0.0313) (0.0254) (0.0101) (0.0109) (0.00581)   
Observations 909 585 467 302 603 597 443 
chi2_exog 23.51*** 2.476* 4.891** 3.064* 3.181* 19.63*** 122.0*** 
chi2 1086*** 1862*** 1124*** 457.0*** 347.7*** 395.6*** 44.32*** 
Tobitll 0.244 0.401 0.428 0.693 0.401 0.379 0.244 
Tobitul 0.800 0.936 0.845 0.936 0.845 0.735 0.547 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors 
 
Table 7. Dynamism of environmental quality on the resources rents and inclusive development relationship 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Developing 
countries 









 Dependent variable: Inequality adjusted human development index 
Governance 0.147*** -0.0158*** 0.0387*** 0.00214 -0.0508*** -0.0176*** -0.163 -0.00269 
 (0.0235) (0.00582) (0.00270) (0.00214) (0.0182) (0.00351) (0.100) (0.00281) 
CO2 -0.0166*** 0.0341*** 0.00177** 0.0290*** -0.00483* 0.00431** 0.199** 0.258*** 
 (0.00540) (0.00399) (0.000832) (0.00367) (0.00249) (0.00179) (0.0938) (0.0335) 
FDI -0.00397** 9.31e-05 0.00265*** 0.00219** 0.00280* -5.93e-05 0.0149* 0.000509* 
 (0.00164) (0.000461) (0.000648) (0.00105) (0.00153) (0.000887) (0.00878) (0.000265) 
trade -0.00260*** 0.000629*** -0.00100*** -0.000135* 0.000551*** 0.000357*** 0.00287 0.000190** 
 (0.000509) (0.000126) (0.000111) (7.28e-05) (0.000199) (0.000123) (0.00189) (9.19e-05) 
Internet -0.00272** 0.00452*** 0.00142*** 0.00166*** 0.00133*** 0.00191*** 0.00573** 0.00708*** 
 (0.00113) (0.000324) (0.000168) (0.000128) (0.000305) (0.000160) (0.00249) (0.000583) 
Resources rents 0.0195*** -0.00346*** 0.00302*** 0.00430*** -0.00717*** -0.00404*** -0.0185 -0.00106* 
 (0.00345) (0.000986) (0.000409) (0.000939) (0.00246) (0.000769) (0.0117) (0.000600) 
CO2×Resources -0.000175* 0.000136* -0.000104*** -0.00117*** 0.000189** 0.000171** -0.00349* -0.00365*** 
 (9.67e-05) (8.19e-05) (2.37e-05) (0.000280) (7.96e-05) (7.85e-05) (0.00197) (0.00133) 
Constant 1.031*** 0.359*** 0.749*** 0.589*** 0.966*** 0.617*** -0.341 0.342*** 
 (0.0865) (0.0213) (0.0148) (0.0135) (0.0810) (0.0115) (0.508) (0.0119) 
Observations 1,961 909 585 467 302 603 597 443 
Net effect 0.0188577 -0.002961 0.002638 0.00000544 -0.006476 -0.003412 s.e s.e 
Threshold 111.42 25.4412 29.038 3.6752 37.9365 23.6257 n.a n.a 
chi2_exog 982.6*** 35.37*** 352.8*** 11.37*** 326.4*** 80.34*** 255.1*** 2.008* 
chi2 196.6*** 986.9*** 1066*** 999.2*** 35.71*** 257.3*** 15.00** 388.6*** 
rank 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
tobitll 0.244 0.244 0.401 0.428 0.693 0.518 0.379 0.244 
tobitul 0.936 0.800 0.936 0.845 0.936 0.840 0.735 0.547 
Source: Authors. NB: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1: CO2 is environmental quality, and FDI is 
foreign direct investments inflows. The net effect in the second column is =0.0188577 or (3.670566×0.00175)+0.0195. In the computation, 
3.670566 is the average value of CO2 emissions. The corresponding threshold is 111.42 or (0.0195/0.000175).
In Asia and the Latin America and Caribbean, the positive unconditional effects predominate 
the negative conditional effects thereby producing positive net effects. This is up to CO2 
emission thresholds of 29.038 and 3.6752, respectively, when the positive effect becomes 
negative. Looking at these developing countries with regard to income levels, the high income 
and the upper-middle countries, the negative unconditional effects predominate the positive 
marginal effects through CO2 emission, producing a negative net effect of resources rents on 
inclusive human development. This is up to CO2 emission thresholds of 37.9365 and 23.6257, 
respectively. These threshold results have policy implications because the corresponding 
thresholds are situated within the CO2 range presented in the summary statistics. 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy implications 
This paper empirically examined the underlying effects of natural resource rents on 
inclusive human development. Specifically, the contribution of this paper to the existing 
literature is at least threefold: first, this is the first attempt to empirically establish the effects of 
natural resources rents on inclusive human development on a global sample of developing 
countries. Second, this study considered the modulating effects of institutional quality and 
environmental quality on the resources rents’ effect on inclusive human development. Third, 
developing countries are not uniform with respect to their levels of development. Some are rich 
in natural resources than others, while each country or region is peculiar with its own type of 
natural resources. Besides some have comparative advantages based on their geographical 
locations while others in terms of their export structure. This study therefore undertakes a 
comparative analysis based on geographical groupings, income levels, levels of development and 
export structure. The methodology was based on the IV Tobit regression on a sample of 107 
developing countries. The results of the estimation indicated that natural resource rent has a 
positive direct effect on inclusive human development in developing countries. Looking at 
regional groupings, income levels, level of development and export structure, this direct positive 
effect was only noticeable in oil-exporting countries, Latin America and the Caribbean; upper-
middle income countries and less developed countries. Negative significant effects were 
observed in Africa, high income, lower-middle income, lower-income and least developed 
countries. Looking at the transmission mechanisms, when the interactive variables of governance 
and environmental quality were introduced, the modulating channel through governance exerted 
a robust negative synergy effect in all samples except for Africa, lower-middle and low-income 
countries where the modulation of governance had a positive synergy effect. When the 
interactive variable of CO2 was introduced, for Africa, the negative unconditional effect of 
natural resources overrides the positive marginal effect through CO2 emission producing a 
negative net effect of natural resources rents on inclusive human development. This was up to a 
policy threshold of 25.4412 of CO2 emission when the   negative effect becomes positive. For 
Asia and the Latin America and Caribbean, the positive unconditional effects prevailed over the 
negative conditional effects, producing positive net effects. This was up to CO2 emission 
thresholds of 29.038 and 3.6752, respectively, when the positive effect becomes negative. 
Looking at these developing countries in terms of their income levels, the high income and the 
upper-middle income countries, the negative unconditional effects predominates the positive 
marginal effects through CO2 emission producing a negative net effect of resources rents on 
inclusive human development. This was up to a CO2 emission threshold of 37.9365 and 23.6257, 
respectively. 
The policy implications of this study engage policy makers in developing countries not to 
neglect the opportunities offered by natural resources in their development strive. In this case, 
there is need for proper governance, as governance quality has proven to show a devastating 
effect on the resources rent and inclusive development relationship. In this respect, governments 
should implement proper mechanisms for the fight against corruption in the oil sector, and to 
resolve internal and cross-border conflicts that have often led to illegal exploitation of natural 
resources. Moreover, there is need for environmental protection to avoid the destructive CO2 
emission threshold point within these economies. Besides, policy models should be elaborated 
based on the specificities of each economy, in this regard, the geographical location, income 
level, level of development and export structure should be considered in policy evaluation and 
not based on global experiences. 
In summary, contingent on engaged specificities, where conditional effects are negative, 
negative thresholds for complementary policies have been provided and in scenarios where 
conditional impacts are positive, actionable positive thresholds have been provided. Thresholds 
for complementary policies imply that when the modulating variables have reached the critical 
levels, the modulating variables should be complemented with other policy initiatives in order to 
maintain the positive incidence of resource rents on human development. Conversely, positive 
thresholds are critical levels of the moderating variables that should be attained in order for 
resource rents to engender a positive incidence of the outcome variable.  
 This study obviously leaves space for future research especially in the light of 
considering other moderating variables by which natural resource rents can improve human 
development. Moreover, country-specific studies using the relevant analytical cross-specific 
approaches are also worthwhile for more country-oriented implications.  
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Appendix 1. List of Countries under Study (107) 
Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo 
Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Dem. Rep of Congo, Rep of Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini (Kingdom of), Ethiopia, Fiji, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong 
Kong, China (SAR), Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao 
People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Suriname, Tanzania (United Republic 
of), Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, 
Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
  
Appendix 2. Variables and data sources 
Variables abbreviation Source 
Foreign direct investment 
inflows (%GDP) 
FDI WDI 
Trade (% of GDP) Trade WDI 
Governance index Governance Authors from WGI data 
Control of corruption corruption WGI 
Government effectiveness Government_eff WGI 
Political stability and absence of 
violence 
political_stability WGI 
Regulatory quality reg_qual WGI 
Rule of law rule_law WGI 
Voice and accountabity voice_acc WGI 
Individuals using internet (% of 
population) 
Internet WDI 
CO2 emissions (metric tons per 
capita) 
CO2 WDI 
total natural resources rents (% 
GDP) 
Resources_rent WDI 
Forest rents (% GDP) Forest_rent WDI 
Mineral Rent (% GDP) Mineral_rent WDI 
Oil rent (%GDP) Oil_rent WDI 
 
